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This paper provides up to date firm level analysis of the production technology 
and cost structures in the U.S. electric power generation industry. The paper 
applies an econometric approach into a dual restricted variable cost function 
within a “temporal equilibrium” framework. The Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation is used to estimate the cost structures in the electric 
power generation industry. This paper is empirically implemented using a panel 
data (1986-1998) on 32 nuclear power generations for major investor owned 
utilities. The major result indicates that most of electric utilities in the nuclear 
electricity generation industry overutilized capital in production over time. 
Technological progress may have slowed over the sample period of this study. 
The results also show that electric utilities with small generation were operating 
at decreasing returns to scale whereas those with large generation were operating 
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1. Introduction 
The U.S. electricity industry comprises of four major segments; generation, transmission, 
distribution and marketing. Generation is the production of electricity from other energy sources 
such as burning of fossil fuel (i.e. coal, oil, and natural gas), nuclear fission, hydro, or 
geothermal.  When the electricity is generated, transmission allows the electricity to be 
transported at high voltages and long distances from generation plants to local utility companies. 
Distribution is the process of moving electricity from the high-voltage transmission grid to lower 
voltages and the delivery of that power to users for heating, lighting, air conditioning, and other 
personal and commercial uses. Finally, the marketing section will involve the processes of 
advertising, selling, and billing for electricity uses. 
  The basis for historical regulation of the U.S. electricity industries has been to deal with 
natural monopoly issues in the production of electricity after the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 passed by the Congress had allowed independent generators to 
sell their electricity to utilities at regulated rates. These regulated rates were typically set equal to 
average cost instead of marginal cost of production. Traditionally, an electricity customer has 
paid one regulated price for electricity to a single vertically integrated utility responsible for 
generation, transmission, distribution, and marketing. The 1992 Energy Policy Act, followed by 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC’s) Orders 888 and 889, expanded 
PURPA’s initiative by forcing utilities with transmission network to deliver power to third 
parties at nondiscriminatory cost-based rates. These policy initiatives recognize that while 
electrical transmission and distribution remain natural monopolies, competition in generation is 
possible with open access to transportation networks. Deregulation in the electricity markets has 
date been incomplete with continued regulation in some of its segments. Under partial  
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regulation, electricity markets are not really deregulated but restructured. Brennan, Palmer, and 
Martinez (2002) provide a good review of the actions and roles of state and federal regulators to 
the U.S. electricity industry and issues surrounding its deregulation and restructuring. 
Electricity is generated using a variety of different technologies and fuels. Fossil-fuel-
fired boilers producing steam for turbine generators remain the dominant electricity generation 
technology in the United States. About 61.1 percent of all the electricity in 1999 supplied by the 
U.S. electric power industry comes from steam turbines fired by fossil fuel. Of this amount, coal-
fired generation accounts for 84 percent, natural gas accounts for 12.7 percent, and petroleum 
comprises 3.3  percent (Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2000).  Nuclear power 
generation is the second largest sector of the U.S. electricity industry and currently constitutes 
nearly 18.6 percent of total net generation technology. There are approximately 130 nuclear 
power generating units operated over the country in the recent year (Nuclear Energy Institute 
(NEI), 2000).   However, technological and economic problems, including environmental 
factors, safety and waste disposal issues, may continue to limit growth prospects for nuclear 
power.  No new nuclear plants have been constructed in the United States in recent years. The 
remaining power generation is from hydroelectric (8.7 percent), and nonutility (11.6 percent). 
Buyers of electricity are typically classified as residential, commercial, and industrial 
customers. Each customer class purchases approximately one-third of the total power sold in the 
United States. Sellers of electricity are classified into the following categories: Investor-Owned 
Utilities (IOUs), publicly owned utilities, rural electric cooperatives, federally owned utilities, 
and Independent Power Producers (IPP). IOUs traditionally have been vertically integrated 
utilities generating, transmitting, and distributing the electricity that they sell to customers living 
in their exclusive territories. IOUs are the most important players in electricity markets. The EIA  
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(2000) report indicates that IOUs own 71 percent of the U.S. generating capacity owned by both 
utilities and nonutility generators in the United States and are responsible for 74 percent of all 
retail sales of electricity. Furthermore, publicly owned utilities account for about 14 percent of 
the U.S. generating capacity and 15 percent of electricity sales to final customers. The rural 
electric cooperatives, federally owned utilities, and IPP account for the remaining generating 
capacity and retail sales of electricity. 
    The recent studies of the U.S. electricity industry have used data on steam electric 
power generation for major IOUs to estimate cost structures and the possible savings in the 
production costs [e.g., Considine (2000), Atkinson and Primont (2002), Rungsuriyawiboon and 
Stefanou (2003)]. These studies used the data on the generation source which represents the 
dominant part of the U.S. electricity industry. The number of previously published studies on 
cost structures and scale economies for nuclear power generation is relatively small and outdated 
[e.g., Krautmann and Solow (1988), Marshall and Navarro (1991), Canterbery, Johnson, and 
Reading (1996)]. The purpose of this paper is to provide up to date information on cost structures 
of nuclear power generation. The paper is empirically implemented using panel data on 32 
nuclear power generation for major IOUs over the time period of 1986-1998.
 Since the U.S. 
electric utility industry has been undergoing a restructuring, electricity deregulation and 
restructuring are now on the policy agenda in most states. The measures obtained in this paper in 
addition to those of the previous studies in this industry will provide useful information for 
regulators in designing suitable policies to promote the efficiency and productivity of electric 
utilities in the industry. 
This paper applies an econometric model to estimate the structure of production for 
nuclear electricity generation. The paper adopts a dynamic factor demand approach developed by  
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Lau (1976) and McFadden (1978) using the dual restricted variable cost function. The restricted 
variable cost function reflects production or technological constraints facing the firm when 
output and certain input quantities referred as quasi-fixed inputs are fixed in the short-run. This 
framework of the firm’s optimization problem is referred to as a “temporal equilibrium or partial 
static equilibrium”. This model allows solving short-run demand equations for variable input and 
long-run demand equations for both variable and quasi-fixed inputs. The paper defines the 
functional form of the restricted variable cost function in a form of the Generalized Leontief 
(GL) functional form introduced by Diewert (1971). The system equation consisting of the 
restricted variable cost function and its input demand equations is implemented by using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate the parameters of the restricted variable 
cost function. Moreover, this paper obtains other economically meaningful measurements such 
as input demand elasticities, economies of scale, capacity utilization, and technological change in 
the nuclear electric power generation industry.  
  The outline of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a model 
specification of the short-run restricted variable cost function for electric power generation. This 
is followed by a discussion of the data set and variables. The next section provides the estimation 
procedures and the estimated results of cost structures for nuclear power generation and then 
conclusions follow. 
 
2. Model Specification 
  The economic theory suggests that cost function for electric power generation will 
depend on the levels of outputs and the prices of inputs such as fuel, labor and maintenance,  
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capital, and state of technology. Given exogeneity of output, input prices and state of technology, 
a cost function for the firm can be solved by 
  ∑ =
i
i i i X P Z Y P TC min arg ) , , ( ,       (1) 
subject to  ) , ( Z X f Y i = ,                  
where TC  denotes total cost,  i P denotes the price of i-th input (i.e. fuel, labor and maintenance,  
and capital),  i X  denotes the quantity of i-th input, Y  denotes output and Z   denotes 
technological level. 
  Since electricity utility firms have added very little new capacity in recent years, capacity 
inputs are not variable in the short run. In addition, nuclear power plants represent large, discrete 
pieces of equipment. Once they are built, there is likely to be little scope for adjusting the capital 
stock in order to change relative prices.  The economic decision is to minimize cost with respect 
to variable inputs such as fuel, labor and maintenance conditional on output and capital 
constraints. 
  Then, there exists the following short-run restricted variable cost function for electric 
power generation. 
  () Z Y K P P VC VC , , , 2 1 = ,      (2)                             
 
where VC  is short-run variable costs depend upon two variable input prices: fuel  1 P , and the 
aggregate of labor and maintenance  2 P , contingent upon predetermined levels of capital stocks 
K , nuclear electric power generation Y , and the state of technology Z , represented with a time 
trend. VC  is non-negative and non-decreasing in Y , homogenous of degree one, non-decreasing, 
and concave in the variable input prices  i P  ( ) 2 , 1 = i , and non-increasing and convex in the levels 
of quasi-fixed factors K .  
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  To implement this model, the functional form of the restricted variable cost function will 
be presented  in a form of the GL functional form
1. The following GL short-run restricted 
variable cost function with non-constant returns to scale and with non-neutral technological 
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where  t  index of time periods;  f  index of firms;  1 = i  and  2 = j ;  α δ γ , ,and   are unknown 
parameters, and Dft s are firm dummy variables for fixed firm effects. Morrison (1988) 
demonstrates that the GL functional form allows linear parameter restrictions for testing long-run 
constant returns to scale ( ) 0 = = = = yy yz yk iy γ γ γ δ  and neutral technological change 
( ) 0 = = = = zk zz yz iz γ γ γ δ . 
Given exogenous variable input prices ( ) i P  and using Shepard’s lemma by taking the 
partial differential of the short-run variable costs with respect to variable input prices, the input 
demand functions can be obtained by the following equation.     
() ,
2
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1  The GL functional form is good approximation of technology with limited input substitution possibilities [Cave 
and Christensen (1980)] and it allows a closed-form solution for equilibrium levels for quasi-fixed inputs [Morrison 
(1988)].  
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for  j i,  = 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
The system equation consisting of the restricted variable cost function in equation (3) and 
its input demand equations in equation (4) will be used to estimate the parameters of the 
short-run variable costs. Caves, Christensen, and Swanson (1981) show that characteristics of 
long-run production can be derived from the restricted cost function. The long-run cost function 
TC  at time period t  can be calculated by the following equation. 
  ,
*
t kt t t K P VC TC + =  (5) 
 
where  kt P  is the ex ante user cost of capital and 
*
t K  is the optimal capital stock. 
The optimal capital stock at time period t   ( )
*
t K  can be derived from the capital 
equilibrium under the necessary conditions for convexity of  0 /
* < ∂ ∂ t t K VC  and 
0 /
2 * 2 > ∂ ∂ t t K VC . Lau (1978) and Morrison (1985a) showed that the shadow value of capital 
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The necessary conditions for convexity are as follows: 
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A measure of scale economics, which are defined as the proportionate increase of cost 
with the increase in the level of output, can be associated with the size of generating units or with 
multiunit at the plant level. Nerlove (1963) and Christensen and Green (1976) defined short-run 

























1 , (10) 
 
where the value of the 
SR
t SCE  greater than zero imply scale economies, while values less than 
zero implying scale diseconomies. 
  In order to measure long-run scale economy, the derivative terms in equation (10) must 
be evaluated at the long-run equilibrium for given input prices, output, and the state of 
technology. Long-run scale economy measures include the output-induced changes in capital 
stocks. In a long-run equilibrium, the shadow value of capital  ( ) kt t t kt P K VC Z = ∂ ∂ − =
* / , implies 
that long-run marginal costs simply equal short-run marginal costs evaluated at optimal capital 
stocks. A long-run scale economy measure can be defined as unity minus the ratio of long-run 
marginal cost to long-run average cost. Mathematical derivations of short-run and long-run input 




Data used in this paper consist of a pooled time-series and cross-section of plants 
generating electricity from nuclear power. The data on the nuclear power generation for major  
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investor-owned utilities in the United States are obtained over the period 1986-1998. The 
primary sources of data are obtained from the Energy Information Administration, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
The data set used in this paper contains the measurements of firm output and input prices 
for nuclear power production. Output variable is represented by net nuclear power generation in 
megawatt-hour (mwh). The price of fuel is the multilateral Tornqvist price index for uranium
2. 
The prices of uranium are the weighted-average-uranium price received by U.S. utilities in 
Dollars per Pound U3O8 Equivalent. The quantities of fuel equal the nuclear power production 
fuel costs divided by the multilateral Tornqvist price index for fuels. The price of labor and 
maintenance aggregate is the multilateral Tornqvist price for labor and maintenance. The price of 
labor is a company-wide average wage rate. The price of maintenance and other supplies is a 
price index of electrical supplies
3. The quantities of labor and maintenance are measured as the 
aggregate costs of labor and maintenance divided by a multilateral Tornqvist price index for 
labor and maintenance. The cost shares for labor are computed by weighting the labor costs of 
nonfuel variable costs with summation of total operation and labor expenses. The capital stock is 
measured by using estimates of the value of capital stocks known as a perpetual inventory 
approach mentioned in Considine (2000). This method involves estimating a benchmark capital 
stock based upon installed capacity in a base year valued at replacement cost and then updating 
this value each year using annual plant and equipment retirements and capital expenditures. The 
price of capital is the yield of the firm’s latest issue of long term debt adjusted for appreciation 
and depreciation of the capital good using the Christensen and Jorgenson (1970) cost of capital 
formula. 
                                                           
2   For the formula how to construct the multilateral Tornqvist index, see Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998, Ch 4) 
3   All indices used in this paper are obtained and calculated relative to the base period 1992.  
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The original panel of 56 firms is reduced to 32 because many companies are subsidizes of 
holding companies
4. A list of electric utilities and a summary of the sample which reports 
average annual production and average total observed cost for each firm from 1986-1998 are 
summarized in Table 1. Average production over the period ranges from a low of 0.5 million 
mwh by Eastern Utilities Associates to 61.8 million mwh by Commonwealth Edison Co. 
Average production across all firms is 11.2 million mwh with a standard deviation of 12.4 
million mwh. There are 20 firms with generation below the sample mean, and one firm that is 
nearly five times larger than the average firm. Average total observed cost is the ratio of the sum 
of variable cost and capital charges to generation. Average total observed cost over the period 
ranges from the lowest costs of 2.1 cents per kwh by Virginia Electric and Power Co. to 15.2 
cents per kwh by Public Service to NM. Average total observed cost across all firms is 4.7 cents 
per kwh with a standard deviation of 5.5 cents per kwh. Table 2 presents a summary of the data 
used in this study. The mean of fuel price is 1.407 with a standard deviation of 0.480, and of 
labor and maintenance is 0.969 with a standard deviation of 0.170. The mean user cost of capital 
is 0.099 with a standard deviation of 0.023. The mean of fuel quantity is 0.567 million dollars 
with a standard deviation of 0.684 million dollars, and of labor and maintenance is 1.708 million 
dollars with a standard deviation of 1.747 million dollars. The mean value of capital stock is 
12.526 million dollars with a standard deviation of 17.398 million dollars. 
 
4. Estimation Procedures 
The system equation consisting of the short-run restricted variable cost function in 
equation (3) and the two input demand equation in equation (4) can be estimated after appending 
                                                           
4  Christensen and Greene (1976) showed that failure to recognize holding companies results in underestimating 
scale economies.  
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a linear disturbance vector with mean vector zero and variance-covariance matrix Σ into the 
system equation. The system of equations is first estimated with the minimum distance estimator 
developed by Berndt, Hall and Hausman (1974) using White’s (1980) heterscedastic-consistent 
estimator for the standard errors. If the errors in the system equation are normally distributed, 
these estimates are equivalent to maximum likelihood (ML). Then, the estimated results from the 
ML estimation will be compared to the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimation.  
One proposal of the GMM estimation is to find instrumental variables () z  so that they are 
correlated with exogenous variables in the model but uncorrelated with residuals ( ) ε . That 
implies a set of orthogonality conditions that  0 ) ' ( = ε z E . If the disturbances are heteroscedastic 
and serially correlated, the estimation from the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
can be corrected by applying a flexible approach developed by Newey and West (1987). They 
estimated a variance-covariance matrix using weighted inner products of the residuals and 
instrument variables.  
 In this paper, the GMM estimation will be implemented by defining the right-hand side 
variables of each equation in the system equation as instruments. The number of autocorrelation 
terms used in computing the covariance matrix of the orthogonality conditions can be determined 
by the procedure of Newey and West (1994). GMM estimators are asymptotically efficient in a 
large class but are rarely efficient in finite samples.  In addition, GMM estimation requires 
stationary data of variables in the model. The unit root tests for panel data developed by Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (1998) are employed to test the stationary of each variable. These unit root 
tests allow individual effects and different patterns of residual serial correlation. They involve 
estimation conventional unit root regressions for each panel, averaging the unit root statistics, 
and performing a test using the critical values computed by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1998).  
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5. Empirical Results 
  The analysis begins with testing the stationary of each variable. The unit root tests are 
performed with and without a linear trend. The results from the unit root tests are summarized in 
Appendix B. The 20 variables consisting of three endogenous variables (i.e. average cost in 
equation (3) and the two input-output ratios in equation (4)) and 17 predetermined variables 
defined from combinations of input prices, output and capital are tested by following the studies 
of Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1998). The unit root tests have shown that there are 2 unit roots of 
variables without trend and 6 unit roots with trend. The tests reveal that the optimal lag structure 
in the augmented Dickey-Fuller regressions is two periods for all variables tested. Thus, two 
autocorrelation terms are defined in computing the covariance matrix of the orthogonality 
conditions for the GMM estimate.  
Then, a number of hypothesis tests regarding the presences of constant returns to scale 
and neutral technological change were conducted using likelihood ratio tests. The null hypothesis 
of long-run constant return to scale was rejected because the chi-squared test statistics of 285.81 
is higher than the critical value of 11.1 at the 5 percent level of significance. Moreover, the null 
hypothesis of neutral technological change was rejected because the chi-squared test statistic of 
147.21 is higher than the critical value of 11.1 at the 5 percent level of significant. Thus, the 
hypothesis tests suggest that the GL short-run restricted variable cost function in equation (3) 
with non-constant returns to scale and with non-neutral technological change is an appropriate 
form for the analysis. 
The estimated parameters of both models, ML and GMM estimations are reported in 
Table 3. The overall results from both models are very similar and have the same sign for all 
estimated parameters except the estimated parameter γyz. Compared with the ML estimation, the  
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GMM estimation has strong assumption which allows for the correction of autocorrelation 
problem in the model. As a result, it provides more reliable and accurate estimated results. The 
following empirical results are discussed upon the GMM estimates. The positive and significant 
α12 indicates that there are substitutions between energy and the labor and maintenance 
aggregate. The test of overidentifying restrictions from GMM estimation using the Hansen 
(1982)  J  test is significant. The null hypothesis fails to reject implying that the additional 
instrumental variables are valid, given a subset of the instrument variables is valid and exactly 
identifies the coefficient. The parameter estimates of the GMM estimation are used to calculate 
other economically meaningful measurements such as input demand elasticities, economies of 
scale, capacity utilization, and technological change. 
  Following the estimation, the tests for the regularity properties (i.e. monotonicity and 
curvature conditions) were checked at each data point in the sample of 416 observations. The 
tests showed that the monotonicity conditions for output and all inputs were satisfied at more 
than 97 percent of all observations. The concavity condition in the variable input prices and the 
convexity condition in the levels of quasi-fixed factors were satisfied at more than 95 percent of 
all observations. 
  Table 4 reports the estimated results of short and long-run elasticities evaluated at sample 
means. In the short-run, the own-price elasticity of demand for fuels is –0.507. The result is not 
much different with the –0.690 estimated by Krautmann and Solow (1988). The short-run output 
elasticity of fuel demand is 0.912 which reflects the close correspondence between fuel 
consumption and nuclear power production.  In the short-run, the demand for labor and 
maintenance is price inelastic. In the long run, the own-price elasticities of demand for fuel and 
labor and maintenance are –0.503 and –0.185, respectively. There are very slight adjustment  
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between short-run and long-run of own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand for fuels, 
labor and maintenance. The negative labor maintenance elasticity of capital demand indicates 
that capital and labor are complements, but the result indicates insignificant due to large standard 
error of the estimate. These results are consistent with the previous study by Krautmann and 
Solow (1988). The estimate for the own-price elasticity of capital is -2.102, also considerably 
very close to their estimate of -2.334. The short-run and long-run technological change 
elasticities of fuels, labor and maintenance in Table 4 provide insightful information for policy 
makers in designing policies to achieve a high growth rate in the production of electricity. The 
results indicate the technological change is biased toward the aggregate labor and maintenance, 
while it is biased against fuel in the short run. These results imply that the direction of 
technological change is fuel-saving and the capital-using in the short run. The long-run results 
indicate the technological change is biased toward capital, while it is biased against fuel and the 
aggregate labor and maintenance. These results imply that the direction of technological change 
is fuel- and the aggregate of labor and maintenance-saving and the capital-using in the long run. 
  Table 5 indicates that short-run marginal cost is 0.386 cents per kwh at the sample mean 
and increases to 0.493 cents per kwh in the long-run. Long-run average cost is 2.199 cents per 
kwh which it is approximately half of actual total average cost. The short and long run 
technological changes are negative. The estimates of technological change suggest that 
technological progress also shifts the cost function down over time. The magnitudes of the 
technological change are relatively small, but significant. These results suggest that 
technological progress in nuclear power generation may have slowed over the sample period of 
this study. The estimated result of short-run scale economies is 0.895 at the sample mean and 
decreases to 0.776 in the long-run. The estimated results suggest evidence of scale economies in  
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the production of the electricity industry in this sample data. The average shadow value of capital 
reported in Table 5 is approximately 4.2 percent, which is considerably below the average user 
cost of capital of about 10 percent. The estimated optimal capital stocks as defined in equation 
(7) are calculated and compared to the actual capital stocks to account for the capacity utilization 
which provide some insight into the efficiency of capital use by an electric utility. Values of the 
ratio of optimal capital to actual capital stocks less than one imply that an electric utility is 
over-utilizing capital while values greater than one imply that an electric utility is under-utilizing 
capital. Table 5 reports that the average estimated optimal capital stock as a percentage of 
observed capital is about 60 percent. This result suggests that, on an average, electric utilities in 
the nuclear electricity generation industry had used current capital stocks at the disequilibrium 
level and they overutilized capital in production over time. 
Figure 1 plots the estimates of short- and long-run scale economies for different output 
levels. Negative numbers indicate scale diseconomies and positive number with greater (less) 
than 1 implies increasing (decreasing) returns to scale. The estimates indicate scale economies in 
nuclear power generation. Figure 1 implies decreasing returns to scale at smaller outputs, with 
increasing returns to scale prevailing at larger outputs, or in other words, the downward sloping 
of short-long run average total cost curve. 
 
6. Conclusions 
  The purpose of this paper is to provide up to date the firm level analysis of the production 
technology and cost structures in the U.S. electric power generation industry. Unlike the recent 
studies using data on steam electric power generation, this paper is empirically implemented 
using panel data on 32 nuclear power generation for major investor owned utilities over the time 
period of 1986-1998. This generation source is the second largest sector of the U.S. electricity  
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industry. The number of previously published studies on this generation source is relatively small 
and outdated. Since the U.S. electric utility industry is undergoing a restructuring, electricity 
deregulation and restructuring are now on the policy agenda in most states. The measures 
obtained in this study in addition to those of the previous studies using data on steam electric 
power generation will provide useful information for regulators in designing suitable policies to 
promote the efficiency and productivity of electric utilities in the industry. 
This paper applies an econometric approach into a dual restricted variable cost function 
to estimate input demand and scale elasticities, capacity utilization, and technological change 
within a “temporal equilibrium” framework. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation is used to estimate the cost structures in the nuclear electric power generation 
industry. The major result indicates that most of electric utilities in the nuclear electricity 
generation industry overutilized capital in production over time. Technological progress may 
have slowed over the sample period of this study. The results also indicate decreasing returns to 
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Appendix A: Derivations of Short- and Long-Run Elasticities 
 
The short-run own-price and cross-price elasticities of input demand can be derived by taking 
partial derivative of the input demand in equation (4) with respect to input prices. 
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,  i ∀ . (A4) 
The long-run own-price and cross-price elasticities of input demand with respect to input price 
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 .  (A8) 
Define the numerator and denominator of the optimal capital in equation (9) as 
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.        (A15) 
The short-run elasticity of cost with respect to technological change is 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
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    Without Trend    With Trend 











  Y VC   -11.436 0.000    -8.168  0.000 
  Y X1   -1.973 0.048    3.164  0.002 
  Y X 2   -12.545 0.000    -12.391  0.000 
 
1 P   -8.475 0.000    -3.903  0.000 
 
2 P   7.954 0.000    0.491  0.623
* 
 
2 1P P   -3.092 0.002    -0.371  0.710
* 
  Y P 1   -6.228 0.000    -6.201  0.000 
  Y P 2   2.057 0.040    -2.833  0.004 
  () Y P P 2 1 +   -0.275 0.783
*   -0.960  0.336
* 
  Y K P 1   -7.613 0.000    0.353  0.724
* 
  Y K P 2   1.773 0.076
*   -2.600  0.009 
  () K P P 2 1 +   -3.399 0.001    -11.308  0.000 
  () Y K P P 2 1 +   -7.644 0.000    -3.993  0.000 
 
1 2 P P   -5.379 0.000    11.170  0.000 
  Y   -5.056 0.000    -9.064  0.000 
  Y   -3.930 0.000    -5.871  0.000 
  Y K   -5.578 0.000    -5.811  0.000 
  K   2.891 0.004    0.153  0.878
* 
  Y K   -9.008 0.000    -7.809  0.000 
 
2 1 P P   -9.206 0.000    0.252  0.801
* 
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Table 1: Nuclear electric power generation and average total cost, firm means, 1986–1998 












The Southern Company 
Arizona Public Service  
Entergy Corporation 
Baltimore Gas & Electric  
Carolina Power & Light  
Centerior Energy Corp 
Commonwealth Edison  
Consolidated Edison Co-NY  
Consumers Energy  
Delmarva Power & Light  
Duke Power  
El Paso Electric  
Florida Power & Light  
General Public utilities Corp 
Kansas City Power & Light  





































Pacific Gas & Electric
Pennsylvania Power & Light
Public Service Co of NM
Public Service Electric & Gas
San Diego Gas & Electric
Southern California Edison
Union Electric
United Illuminating  
Virginia Electric & Power  
Wisconsin Electric Power  
Wisconsin Power & Light  














































Table 2:  Data summary for 32 electric utilities over the periods of 1986 to 1998 
Variable Units  Mean  S.  D.  Minimum  Maximum 
Output  
Price Index of Fuel     
Price Index of Labor and Maintenance 
User Cost of Capital          
Fuel 


























17.398   





  0.010 
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates of ML and GMM Estimations 
                
  ML  GMM 
Parameter  Estimate  St. Error  P-Value      Estimate  St. Error  P-Value 
α12   0.4263 0.1052  [.000]      0.6447  0.0744 [.000] 
δ1y   0.1806 0.0698  [.001]      0.0475  0.0451 [.293] 
δ 2y   -1.2450 0.2882  [.000]      -0.9328  0.0977  [.000] 
δ1z   0.4012 0.1185  [.001]      0.6223  0.0747 [.000] 
δ 2z   0.6154 0.1152  [.000]      0.7990  0.0680 [.000] 
γ yy   -0.0120 0.0054  [.026]      -0.0018  0.0035  [.611] 
γ yz   0.0084 0.0024  [.000]      -0.0067  0.0019 [.000] 
γ zz   -0.0135 0.0206  [.000]      -0.1255  0.0143  [.000] 
δ1k   0.0604 0.0571  [.289]      0.0502  0.0459 [.274] 
δ 2k   0.0125 0.1397  [.929]      0.0158  0.0529 [.766] 
γ yk   -0.0123 0.0117  [.292]      -0.0114  0.0089  [.203] 
γ zk   0.0141 0.0098  [.154]      0.0043  0.0092 [.637] 
γ kk   -0.0048 0.0028  [.084]      -0.0312  0.0019  [.103] 
                
Equation R
2 DW        R
2 DW   
Cost 0.468  1.246      0.431  1.147   
Fuel 0.671  0.902      0.616  0.774   
L & M  0.476  1.300      0.472  1.220   
                
Log likelihood value  -107.728         




  Table 4: Short and Long−Run Elasticities Evaluated at Sample Means 
Prices 
Quantity 
Fuel  Labor and 
Maintenance  Capital 
Output  Technological 
change 
Short-Run 
    Fuel 
 




    Fuel 
 
    Labor & Maintenance 
 
    Capital 
 






















       –0.185 
(0.022) 


























   –0.134 
(0.176) 










       –0.029 
(0.007) 




Notes:  Standard errors are in parentheses.    
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Table 5: Estimates of Other Costs, Scale, Capital Stock Measures 
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Figure 1: Short- and Long-Run Scale Economies 
 